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This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). The DSB is a Federal

Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of

Defense. Statements, opinions, recommendations, and conclusions in this report do

not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense. 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OFDEFENSE, 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2030! .3140 
DEFENSE SCIENCE
	 August 6, 1992 
BOARD 
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. 
Chairman 
Defense Science Board 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
I am pleased to submit to you the final report of this second Defense Science 
Board (DSB) Task Force on the National Aero-Space Plane (NASP). 
The Task Force was charged with the assessment of the degree to which the 
many technical challenges of the program have been resolved thus far, or are likely to 
he resolved by the end of Phase II. To this end, the Task Force gathered information by 
conducting two day meetings at the Joint Program Office in Dayton, Ohio, with the 
engine and airframe manufactures at Palmdale, California, and at the NASA Langley 
Research Center, Hampton, Virginia. 
The initial DSB Task Force on NASP completed its review in the summer of 1987. 
Since then, substantial technological progress has been made during Phase U of the 
program in all of the technological areas critical to NASP. It is dear that the program 
emphasis on the NASP. vehicle configuration during the intervening years has resulted 
in a strongly focused, very productive, multi-discipline technology program. 
We have concluded, however, that at the end of Phase U, as currently structured, 
fundamental uncertainties will continue to exist in at least four critical areas: boundary 
layer transition; stability and controllability; propulsion performance; and structural and 
sub-system weight. Boundary layer transition and saamjet performance cannot be 
validated in existing ground test facilities and the weight estimates have insufficient 
reserves for the inevitable growth attendant to material allowables, fastening and joining, 
and detailed con.tiguration issues. The essential criterion for entering Phase LU is an X-30 
vehicle design with reasonable assurance of demonstrating single stage to orbit (SSTO) 
performance. Using optimistic assumptions on transition and scramjet performance, and 
the present weight estimates on material performance and active cooling, the vehicle 
design does not yet close; the veiccity achieved is short of orbital reiuirements. 
We recommend that the program not enter into a Phase III experimental flight 
vehicle program at this timc but rather proceed with a revised next pha'e, which we 
would define as Phase liE. This phase, lasting approximately three years, would 
continue work in design, materials, computation and propulsiorrup to the limits of 
ground based facilities (Mach 6.5 to Mach 8). The central focus of Phase HE should be 
an unmanned, scaled flight test program to demonstrate- performance and validate 
I	 "'•.' .... . 1210' 
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computer codes for scramjet performance and boundary layer transition. This program 
would explore the hypersonic flight regime from about Mach 12 to Mach 16/18. 
The Task Force was fortunate to be able to include in its membership six 
members who participated in the previous review. All of the members were 
exceptionally well qualified. University, industry and ex-goverriment experience in 
program management and the technologies related to NASP were represented. This 
Task Force, as did its predecessor, strongly supports the goals of the program because 
of the major potential benefits to space launch vehicles, projection of military presence, 
and commercial air transport. 
The program today is on much firmer ground than it was five years ago. Our 
views and recommendations will be generally accepted and concurred in by NASA, the 
JPO and the various supporting contractors. 
I am concerned, however, that the recommendation to invest in reducing the 
uncertainties in critical technologies (Phase TIE) can be interpreted by some as a vote of 
no confidence in the NASP concept. Nothing could be further from the truth. The 
Aerospace Plane will be a major national program. At the time of commitment to the 
experimental flight test vehicle, confidence in cost, schedule and performance 
projections must be high. The program we are recommending is intended to provide 
the technical data-base to make those projections realistic. Too often, in recent years, 
major programs have experienced significant cost over-runs, schedule slips and 
performance shortfalls because they were started with an inadequate technical base, or 
succumbed to unreasonable fiscal or schedule pressures to get the program started. The 
Aerospace Plane can and should avoid such pitfalls. 
A second area of concern is the apparent requirement that the X-30 vehicle 
demonstrate SSTO capability. SSTO with horizontal take off and landing is a desirable 
goal for some operational vehicles resulting from X-30 technology. However, the 
experimental vehicle is intended to explore the envelope of the various flight regimes, 
from take off to orbit insertion, in order to provide the data-base for design of the 
operational vehicles. Low speed and high speed flight can be demonstrated separately. 
For example, removing the requirement that the X-30 take off horizontally could result 
in a less expensive flight test program that would still provide all required technical 
data. This and other alternatives should be explored before committing to the final X-30 
flight test programs. 
On behalf of the Task Force, thank you for the opportunity to constructively 
review this most important national program. 
Sincerely, 
Joseph F. Shea 
1.
SUMMARY 
Six years ago, the Defense Science Board (DSB) initiated a review of the 
concept, technical basis, program content, and missions of the National Aerospace 
Plane WASP) program. The report was completed in September, 1988, and the 
recommendations contributed to strengthening the technical efforts in the NASP 
program. 
Since then, substantial technological progress has been made in the 
technology development phase (Phase II) of the program. Phase II of the program is 
currently scheduled to end in late Fiscal Year 1993, with a decision whether to 
proceed to the experimental flight vehicle phase (Phase lfl) to be made at that time. 
-- - _-This .decisionwil be. a 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administratiou (NASA). 
In February of this year, the DSB was chartered to revisit the NASP program 
to assess the degree to which the many technical challenges of the program have 
been resolved, or are likely to be resolved by the end of Phase H. A Task Force 
comprised of six members of the original study group and three new members was 
formed to perform this assessment. The Task Force gathered information by 
conducting two-day meetings at the NASP Joint Program Office (JPO) at Wright 
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, the NAS? National Program Office, at Palmdale, 
California, and the NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia. 
The Task Force was impressed by the technical progress which has been achieved 
over the past four years in the technologies critical to hypersonic flight aerodynamics, 
mateiials and structures, propulsion, and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) (which 
also supports several other disciplines). It is clear that the:emphasis on the NASP 
vehicle configuration has resulted in a strongly focused, multi-discipliv technology
program which has been more productive than an equivalent investment in advanced 
research and technology in the individual disciplines. 
We also note that the NASP JPO has developed a strong team and an excellent 
spirit of cooperation between the Air Force and NASA, and with the contractor team. 
We found the JPO very cooperative and realistic in assessing the status of the program. 
The NASP contractors are now teamed - - three for the vehicle and two for 
propulsion. A common configuration has emerged, incorporating the advances to 
date in each discipline with sufficient design detail to enable evaluation of the 
remaining performance uncertainties. 
Our review concluded that, at the end of Phase II, fundamental uncertainties 
will exist in at least four critical areas: boundary layer transition (which affects drag 
and thermal loads); propulsion performance (which determines effective specific 
impulse (Isp)); stability and controllability; and structural and sub-system weight 
(which determines mass fraction and, with Isp, payload potential). 
High-speed boundary layer transition of saamjet performance cannot be 
validated in existing ground test facilities. Weight estimates have inadequate 
reserves for the inevitable growth attendant to material ailowables, fastening and 
joining., control needs, and configuration changes. 
The essential criterion for entering Phase III is an X-30 vehicle design with 
reasonable assurance of demonstrating single stage to orbit (SSTO) performance. 
Using optimistic assumptions on transition and scramjet performance, and present 
weight estimates on material performance and active cooling, the vehicle design 
does not close; the velocity achieved is short of orbital requirements. The Task 
I Force concludes that the technology and design base required to justify initiating the 
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X-30 experimental flight vehicle program will not be available at the end of Phase U 
in 1993, if SSTO remains the major requirement. 
This conclusion is a blunt answer to the charter of the Task Force. It is not, 
however it may be otherwise interpreted, a vote of no confidence in the NASP 
concept and the potentially significant technical and operational benefits of 
continued investment in this focused hypersonic technology program. 
The problem is tough. The progress in almost all areas since our last report is 
impressive. With reasonable, yet constrained investment, we believe the 
remaining uncertainties can be narrowed and technologies improved to the point 
where sufficient data will be available to determine whether. an
 SSTO vehicle design 
-	 can be-closed with credible performance margins.--_ 
The NASP IPO recognizes that the accomplishments against Phase II exit 
criteria will not justify a Phase III start. They have proposed a continuation of the 
technology effort to work in design, materials, computation and propulsion up to 
the limits of ground based facilities (Mach 6.5 to Mach 8). In the opinion of the Task 
Force, that approach will never resolve the fundamental technical issues. 
We strongly recommend that an unmanned, scaled vehicle flight test 
program to demonstrate performance and validate computer codes for scramjet 
performance and boundary layer transition be the central focus of the next phase, 
designated Phase IIE. Unmanned, and launched on an available low cost vehicle, it 
could explore the suborbital hypersonic flight regime from (with different 
geometries), about Mach 12 to Mach 16/18. 
The JPO is studying this concept; seems receptive; and is indicating that the 
design and mission costs should be "affordable". In today's fiscal environment, 
-	
:--	
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"affordable" is an imprecise term. To be more precise, the flight test program should 
be completed within four years; cost no more than about $100M per year; and fit 
within a continuation of the present NASP program funding, augmented, 
hopefully, by a more equitable sharing from NASA. 
The above discussion encapsulates our recommendations, which are: 
(1) Do not enter the experimental flight vehicle phase (Phase Ill) at the end 
of 1993, as presently planned. 
(2) Continue the NASP program as a substantial focused technology 
program. The operational potential in the next century is unique. 
(3) Revise the presently proposed program to include unmanned, 
sub-scale flight tests to address the fundamental uncertainties in scramjet 
performance above M-12 and hypersonic boundary layer transition. As 
indicated above, we would define this effort as Phase TIE. 
(4) During Phase HE, continue to refine material selection and vehicle 
design as technology evolves. 
(5) Redress the balance in funding between DoD and NASA. Pursuit of 
hypersonic technology is important to the mission of NASA: "to 
maintain the Nation preeminent in aeronautics and space technology." 
Application of the technology to specific mission areas should continue 
to be studied by DoD (Military) or other potentially benefiting sectors of 
our society (e.g. commercial transport). 
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TERMS OF REFERENCE 
The Task Force was chartered to address, but not limited to, the following 
issues:
1. The adequacy of the current Phase U Exit Criteria, if satisfied, to justify a 
ded.sion to proceed to Phase M. 
2. The likelihood of the completed and planned technical efforts to satisfy 
the current Phase U exit criteria or the exit criteria needed to justify a decision 
to proceed to Phase ilL The efforts in materials and structures for both 
airframe and engine are of particular interest. 
3. The identification of candidate military missions for operational vehicles 
which result from X-30 technology and the technical achievements required 
in the current NASP program to make such vehicles viable. 
4. The adequacy of current plans fcr the Phase III effort, if, completely successful, 
to produce the basis needed to enter system development for a militarily 
useful vehicle. 
The full text of the Terms of Reference, as set forth by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering in his 
letter of 20 February 1992 to the Chairman, Defense Science Board, is at Appendix A. 
C	 -
•1*(.1fISi.1 b1P 
This section summarizes the Task Force response to the issues raised in our 
terms of reference. 
1. In general, the current Phase U Exit Criteria, if satisfied, are adequate to 
justify a decision to proceed to Phase ilL The essential criterion is a 
crele X-30 vehicle design with reasonable assurance of demonstrating 
SSTO performance. As we discuss subsequently, it is desirable to make 
this criterion more explicit with regard to demonstration of scramjet 
performance, boundary layer transition, and controllability, and the 
-	
__characteristicsthaLwou1cLmakethesubsequent4evelopment of an 
operational vehicle resulting from X-30 technology feasible. 
2. Critical Phase II Exit Criteria are not likely to be met. Vehicle design 
margins are inadequate for an SSTO configuration because of structural 
and subsystem weight uncertainties, uncertainty in engine performance, 
and unresclved stability and control issues. Analysis ca1...ibilities and 
ground test facilities are not capable of substantiating quantitative 
performance in at least two critical areas; scramjet performance above 
Mach 10 and where boundary layer transition will occur. 
3. The Military have not yet identified realistic candidate missions for 
operational vehicles which result from X-30 technology. However, there 
are several potentially valuable military missions for such a vehicle. 
6
The SSTO characteristic is the feature that w ill give an operational vehicle 
resulting from X-30 technology unique military capabilities and ability to 
perform useful missions. These missions take advantage of the 
performance and physical domain of an orbital vehicle launched from and 
recovered to a standard military runway and delivering military payloads 
to any point on the earth in a short period of time. The performance 
capability of such a vehicle will challenge future military operators and 
planners to derive military missions not yet conceived. 
The technologies being demonstrated in such a program will have wide 
application for other military missions ana capabilities. These 
technologies will be demonstrated sooner than would have been 
otherwise possible if such a program did not exist. NASP program 
contributions to U.S. competitiveness in the world marketplace are 
important factors that should be considered in designing the future NASP 
program. 
4. Current plans for the Phase 111 effort are in a state of flux. The Task Force 
believes that when the Phase LU program is defined, it can and must be 
designed to make subsequent development of a militarily useful vehicle 
possible. 
The following sections address the technical concerns encountered in our 
review, and amplify our convictions concerning militarily useful missions for 
operational vehicles resulting from X-30 technology. 
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1.	 GENERAL 
The Task Force is impressed by the progress which has been made by the 
NAS? program over the past five years in the technologies critical to hypersonic 
flight.
The NASP technology program has come a long way in reducing the 
uncertainty in our ability to build an experimental flu
	 vehide that would 
demonstrate the desirable characteristics and technologies of a future operational 
military vehicle resulting from X-30 technology. Significant strides have been made 
in engine technology, materials, thermodynamic protection and design techniques, 
all of which bring the vehicle closer to achieving the "design closure" to meet the 
required performance characteristics. 
It has only been in the last year, subsequent to the teaming of the NASP 
contractors, that a common configuration has emerged with sufficient design detail, 
and size, weight and performance estimates, with which to develop the specific 
developmental programs to remove the remaining performance uncertainties. 
Earlier, there were multiple configurations, each with unique design problems and 
performance uncertainties that precluded the development of detailed plans for 
further risk reduction. 
However, even with the new common NASP configuration and the technical 
progress to date, there remain significant uncertainties which preclude final design 
closure. Weight margins are inadequate and engine performance uncertainties are 
8
too large to give high confidence of achieving the design performance at high Mach 
numbers. 
Furthermore, transitioning the NASP to an operational vehicle resulting 
from X-30 technology has additional uncertainties that increase the risk of being able 
to construct an operational vehicle upon completion of the NASP experimental 
flight vehicle program. The addition of operational characteristics into the vehicle, 
such as additional payload capacity, additional performance margins, longer orbital 
duration nd standard maintenance provisions, will require increased engine 
performance and weight reduction which can only be achieved by further 
technological progress. 
The NASP JPO has summarized the achievements to date in Appendix D, 
NASP Status Report Response to the Defense Science Board, dated 14 May 1992. 
The recommendations of the Task .Force ar. based on detailed review of the 
critical technologies and the technical and management experience of the Task Force 
members. The following sections summarize the concerns in structures and 
materials, propulsion and aerodynamics, control, and computational fluid dynamics 
which have shaped our recommendations. 
9
2. STRUCTURES AND MATERIALS 
Clearly, the progress of this program in quality of effort, data produced and 
management competency since the previous DSB review has been significant. The 
exit criteria preparatory to initiation of vehicle design are considered marginal, but 
would be satisfactory with the correction of some apparent deficiencies. The 
relationship of controllability to failure modes (e.g. unctart) and to structural design 
criteria (which can relieve or add) is not clear. The selection of liquid cooled panels 
to accomodate the temperature environment introduces a critical subsystem design 
(which is now safety of flight). Exit criteria for this and other subsystems (i.e., flight 
instrumentation and electrical system) are not explicit. In addition, it is not clear 
why metal matrix material is used if the panels are liquid cooled. The potential for 
using currently available material for these panels should be examined. 
The current structural design criteria indicate a factor of safety requirement of 
1.5 limit (anticipated loads) to ultimate (failure) for aero-elastic induced strains. 
There is at least the same degree or uncertainty in temperature induced strains as 
there is in aero-elastic and they may combine or relieve. Good design practice 
would require proper combination of strains and a factor of 1.5 on these combined 
strains (limit to ultimate). 
The consideration of permitting panel buckling to alleviate some thermal 
strains is probably valid, providing body bending continuity and end bulkhead 
integrity are maintained. Buckling of metal matrix panels, particularly beyond yield 
(i.e. permanent set), is questionable without verification of effect on the low 
ductility matrix fibers. Buckling of cooled panels should be avoided. 
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The use of S' values for allowables is satisfactory if, when combined with 
proper load factors on predicted combined strains, it satisfies a high confidence 
value of no failures. 
The exit criteria would be considered satisfactory if modified as suggested in 
the preceeding paragraphs, and if the panel tests (all types: TI matrix, cooled, et a!) 
are representative of the full scale vehicle and if sufficient (under 
-
	
aero /thermal/ acoustic loadings) testing is accomplished to validate allowable, 
analysis methodology with a confidence level of 90-95%. 
The structural weight fraction is critical in this vehicle, but cautious 
optimistic judgement must be used. While normal fatigue considerations are not a 
factor in this vehicle, the relationship of static strength criteria to normal good 
aircraft design practice is valid. There would appear to be no rationale to deviate 
and accept greater risk of structural failure. 
3. PROPULSION AND AERODYNAMICS 
The NASP program has in place a broad based technology program which 
addresses the critica l
 aspects of an SSTO airbreathing design. However, there are 
some aspects of the technology that are critical to the success of the NA.SP concept 
that cannot be fully matured via ground based testing to the high Mach numbers of 
critical importance. 
* The minimum data puint obtained from test with insufficient data to establish statistical 
significance. As a rule, S base allowable values shall not be above the minimum value obtained from 
testing.
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The two most critical of these are scramjet engine performance and boundary 
layer transition. The NASP program is dependent upon realizing the high-speed 
performance predicted for the scramjet propulsion cycle. Perhaps the highest 
technical risk in the program is the ability to quantify the characteristics of the 
scramjet and its flowpath integration into the airplane. Not far behind in technical 
risk is the unertaintv associated with boundary layer transition. It is essential to 
understand the boundary layer behavior at hypersonic speeds in order to insure 
thermal survival of the airplane structure as designed, as well as to accurately 
predict the propulsion system performance and airplane drag. Excessive 
conservatism in boundary layer predictions will lead to an overweight design 
incapable of achieving SSTO, while excessive optimism will lead to an airplane 
unable to survive in the hypersonic flight environment. Further design 
development and increased confidence in these two technical areas must be of 
paramount importance to the NASP program. 
The research and development of the sa-amjet engine is hampered by 
inherent physical limitations of ground-based test facilities in the hypersonic speed 
regime. These physical limitations preclude ground testing of an entire propulsion 
flowpath (inlet, combustor, and nozzle) at anything above about Mach 8. Even at 
Mach 8, the scramjet cycle is just beginning to be established and, consequently, 
there is uncertainty associated with extrapolating the results into the higher Mach 
regime. At speeds above Mach 8, only small components of the scramjet can be 
tested. These limited component test results are then used in predictive codes to 
estimate overall cycle performance, operability characteristics, and aerodynamic and Ithermal loads in the scramjet engine in the higher Mach regime. 
12
Boundary layer transition and its implications on airplane design are a 
H
	
	 continuing area of research even for subsonic airplanes. For hypersonic airplanes, 
the challenge is even greater due to the sensitivity of the airplane design to location 
of boundary layer transition, and the lack of necessary data to predict boundary layer 
behavior. CFD codes are used to predict boundary layer characteristics, but these 
/
	
	 codes must be anchored with experimental data to enable their use with confidence. 
Experimental data in the hypersonic regime are limited. Wind-tunnel noise 
contamination prohibits the acquisition of high-quality data from that source. To 
counter that problem, special low-noise wind-tunnels have been developed, but 
these quiet tunnels only operate at lower speeds, requiring considerable 
extrapolation to apply the results to hypersonic flight. Reentry vehicles (RVs) 
would appear_toesources of flight data but these are also compromised. Almost all 
RV data are from conical ablating vehicles that introduce contamination into a 
flowfield lacking in crossflow and adverse pressure gradients. Much uncertainty 
exists in hypersonic boundary layer behavior. 
To reduce the risk in these technical areas, the task force recommends that the 
NASP program include a flight vehicle research program as an integral part of the 
technology development program. It appears to us that without such an activity, 
the risk associated with embarking upon a multi-billion dollar X-30 is excessive. 
The exact characteristics of the flight research activity need to be defined through 
technical studies by the program technical staff and should, as a minimum, include 
H	 the following: 
A. Operation of a scramjet high enough into the hypersonic flight regime to 
establish the ability to predict the performance of the total integrated, 
airframe/ propulsion system. To minimize cost of the scramjet flight experiment, 
13
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the scope of the activity needs to be carefully constrained. We envision the 
experiment to be focused on high Mach number (minimum Mach 12 through 
15/18) tests of a scaled version of X-30 flowpath. The program should include key 
physics and modeling, specifically for CFD validation. An appropriate size appears 
to be about the size of the Concept Demonstrator Engine (CDE). Furthermore, the 
flowpath should be carried to the test conditions by a vehicle that does not 
necessarily use the saamjet for acceleration. Principal data objectives should be to 
verify the end-to-end flowpath performance methodologies and to collect data to 
enable an optimized structural design of the X-30 engine. It is envisioned that a 
number of flights will be required to obtain sufficient information. Reusability 
must be considered for the carrier vehicle and the experimental engine. (A 
potential concern is that this experiment be seen as a replacement for the X-30 or 
that it becomes the X-30 itself. The scramjet flight experiment, involving a low-cost 
simple carrier vehicle and scramjet module, cannot and will not address all of the 
technical issues for airbreathing SSTO vehicles.) 
B. Hypersonic boundary layer transition data in the same hypersonic flight 
regime are needed to validate the predictions for the X-30. This will require a shape 
similar to the X-30 so that 3-D effects and representative pressure gradients can be 
achieved. It may be possible, but not necessary, that the same flight research vehicle 
be used for both the scramjet tests and the boundary layer transition studies. 
The need to acquire these data is so important that a significant portion of the 
near-term technology activity should be applied. We fully expect that the 
recommended flight activity will result in a relatively large (perhaps 40-50 ft long) 
and expensive ($200-$300M) vehicle that could reauire a majority of the available 
14
near-term zunding. It is recognized that this will require curtailing other important 
technology development efforts; however, this trade-off is essential. 
In addition to the concern about scrarnjet performance, we also l
 note that the 
X-30 must take-off, climb and accelerate to approximately Mach. 3.5, if hypersonic 
flight is to be reached. Thus, some planning is recommended to prepare for an 
experimental program to develop, verify performance, and certify the engine in this 
speed range. As long as the inlet is properly designed, it will be possible to conduct I	 meaningful tests on the engine at Arnold Engineering Development Center -	 (AEDC). These tests will provide the low speed data necessary for the kinds of 
-.	 assessments mentioned above. 
Note that some preliminary tests are needed to understand the flow field near 
the inlet, and can be obtained by standard model test procedures. 
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4. CONTROL 
"Controllability" demands that the aircraft/engine combination can be 
controlled and regulated throughout the operating space with adequate margins to 
allow for uncertainties and off-nominal conditions. A central prerequisite is that 
sufficient total "control power" be available over adequate effector "bandwidth" 
ranges. Sufficiency implies that: the aircraft can be trimmed to appropriate 
equilibrium states; open-loop aircraft stability and control deficiencies (e.g. 
instabilities) can be redressed; mission-centered and emergency maneuvers/tasks 
can be accomplished; effects of disturbances can be suppressed; etc. Total "control 
power" incorporates the rate and intensity limits for all means of modulating the 
forces and moments on the airplane. It is conventionally defined in terms of force 
and moment rate and position limits on aerodynamic effectors (all-moviflg-wings, 
rudders, drag devices, speed brakes, etc.), rate and position limits on engine 
geometry and fuel flow effectors, etc., and includes base-burning rockets, and 
reaction controls as effectors. The "bandwidth" of a given effector characterizes the 
controller dynamics as a frequency range over which the effector can exert control 
within the rate and position limiting constraints. 
The emphasis to date on controllability has been on SSTO with takeoff and 
landing from a conventional runway. There is, as yet, no assurance That minimal 
command /regulation tasks and maneuvers appropriate for envelope expansion 
prior to SSTO operations or for the collection of atmospheric hypersonic cruise data 
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(usually cited as a secondary NASP mission) can be accomplished- Based on the 
information we reviewed, "controllability" for the most modest of SSTO operations 
appears to be marginally feasible. With the notable exception of approach and 
landing, the more severe maneuvering environment requirements associated with 
envelope expansion and hypersonic cruise missions have yet to play a significant 
role in controllability considerations. 
Lefftjq-
At the outset it is fair to say that controllability issues for NASP are so 
complex, so widely ranging in dynamics and frequency, and so interactive between 
technical disciplines as to have no parallels in aeronautical history. Yet, perhaps 
because of this extreme spectrum of ubiquitous interactions and the consequent 
difficulty of dividing the total controllability problem into easily comprehended 
constituents, "controllability" has received only very modest support thus far in the 
program. For example, many of the possible stability and control problems and 
deficiencies which are likely possibilities somewhere in the envelope have not yet 
been adequately surveyed, much less assessed. Consequently the most fundamental 
initial requirements for elementary aircraft control are not yet fully comprehended. 
In the DSB NASP Task Force progress reviews, existing controllability 
synthesis and analysis areas have been cited by project personnel as "satisfactory" in 
general. These conclusions are based on very preliminary and incomplete analyses, 
with very little simulation or assessment of realism. In the main, the analyses are 
based on very optimistic assumptions, such as first-order actuation dynamics, no 
flexible or slosh modes, impractical "calibrated" feedback, and extremely modest 
maneuvering requirements--basically SSTO and idealized approach and landing. 
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Considering the aerodynamic controls alone 
a. The effector rate and position limits control power quantities are 
strongly dependent on the maneuvers to be performed, disturbances to be 
encountered and offset, abort transients, and the minimum backup positions 
assumed for the actuation. The maneuver complex for the mission phases which 
drive total controllability requirements have not yet been completely defined, so 
general feasibility in this respect cannot currently be determined. 
b. Fortunately, the effector rate and position control power aspects for 
aerodynamic controls are usually set by the lower speed (e.g. approach and landing) 
and trim conditions—which have been examined in a preliminary fashion. To the 
extent that this obtains for NASP, the aero control power effector rate/position 
quantities may be suitable. The aero-surface actuation backups are certainly 
minimums (e.g. single thread rudder actuators, assuming streamlining in the event 
of failure, tandem actuators on other surfaces, etc.). 
	
C.	 Another major aspect of control power is controller and effector 
b'dthc. ."..t pccnt the
	 urs list±clly	 When the presence of 
flexible modes, realistic actuation and other higher frequency dynamics is taken into 
account the higher-frequency controller dynamics will result in significant 
modifications and limitations to the attainable dosed-loop (aircraft plus Stability 
and Control Augmentation System (SCAS)) vehicle stability and control 
characteristics. 
	
.d.	 The analytical procedures used thus far to determine the controller 
characteristics essentially modify the stability derivatives to values appropriate for 
I 
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certain specifications. These procedures imply exceptionally complete knowledge of 
certain key derivatives of the airplane and effective adjustment of such derivatives 
to desired values via feedback and/or crossfeed control using idealized feedback. 
Uncer ainties in the derivatives, difficulty in determining reasonable surrogates for 
the needed aircraft states (e.g. sideslip angle), and potentially very high gains to 
achieve the desired values, require much more detailed consideration of higher 
frequency effects such as flexible modes if this procedure is to be used as a basis for 
feasibility assessment. 
Considering the engine controls alone: 
a. The Vehicle Management System (VMS) is an int2grated 
aircraft/engine system which must cope with enormous ranges of control modes, 
dynamic frequencies,. and dynamic interactions. The degree of understanding of the 
propulsive/aerodynamic forces and moments which have to be countered by the 
VMS is still in an embryonic state. 
b. In their current manifestations, the engine effectors (geriry and fuel 
flow controls) have bnnd
	 which may be adequate at very-low amplitude 
levels. But the maximum rates are far too low for any but the mildest maneuvers 
(perhaps idealized SSTO). Any higher-frequency engine control fluctuations needed 
to satisfy propulsion/ aerodynamic decoupling or similar requirements are not yet 
included. These can demand major changes in the VMS actuation. 
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Considering the thermal control system alone: 
a. Very great uncertainties exist at a fundamental level. For example, 
design depends on knowledge of inside and outside heat transfer processes. On the 
outside this depends on boundary layer transition, while on the inside, major 
uncertainties are connected with supersonic burning. 
b. Because of the highly diverse thermal states at various points cf the 
vehicle, the overall thermal control system is intrinsically 'very diffuse. Yet the 
number of sensor and actuation "control points" presently planned is quite small, 
implying a high degree of open-loop and/or calibrated control. 
One of the current deficiencies in the NASP, from the standpoint of SSTO 
capability, is the marginal structural weight fraction. There are at least three ways 
in which' the structural weight might be reduced using the VMS. These are: 
a. Active structural maneuver load and flexible modes controls. 
b. Active flutter control. 
C.	 Ultra-precision landing control. 
S. COMPUTATIONAL FLUID DYNAMICS 
The primary CFD techniques in widespread use within the NASP program 
are 3-D inviscid techniques or 2-D viscous techniques. The 2-D viscous techniques 
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are primarily used to provide calibrations of the less expensive methods. 
Turbulence modeling is based, for the most part, on eddy viscosity modeling. The 
algebraic models are most commonly used along with some application of 
differential equation models. Capability to use the Reynolds stress models is under 
development, but not within the program, and not on a schedule driven by the 
program. Development of turbulence/chemistry interaction models is proceeding 
under a Government Work Package and remarkable progress has been made. The 
modeling work is slated to complete next year, but there are not specific plans for 
validation other than use of the existing sparse database. Transition modeling is 
focused around the en method with the 2-D codes transferred to the contractors in 
1989 and the 3-D codes transferred to the contractors in June 1992. The 2-D n-factor 
codes have correlated transition location prediction with RV flight data quite 
accurately (15% according to the contractors). The 3-D code is currently being 
validated and substantial work remains to bring this code into practice in the 
program. When the contractor user community becomes skilled in the use of this 
methodology it should offer a similar improvement in prediction accuracy. 
Comparisons of prediction transition location by the 3-1) it-factor codes compared 
with quiet tunnel data are quite good, but tunnel data are available only at low Mach 
numbers (up to approximately Mach 3.5). The hypersonic, 3-D transition prediction 
capability is as yet too new to assign uncertainty numbers, and lack of validation 
data makes this area critical. 
6.	 APPLICATIONS 
The Department of Defense (DoD) elected to become a partner in the 
development of NASP in the mid-1980s because of the potential, if the concept 
proved feasible, for effective accomplishment of military missions using very high 
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speed hypersonic and orbital vehicles. In addition, it had tha capability for very 
rapid and potentially inexpensive access to space for military satellites and other 
payloads. With the Soviet threat greatly dissipated, the worle environment has 
undergone drastic restructuring and the funding for military capabilities has 
declined. Therefore, the need for a NASP flight test program, subsequently leading 
to the development of operational vehicles for military operations, must be 
reassessed. The Defense Science Board Task Force has accomplished this 
reassessment with particular focus on the need for SSTO capability — the single most 
demanding requirement on the performance of NASP and operational vehicles 
which result from X-30 technology. 
Most assessments of this type fall into the trap of comparing future 
capabilities, like that of an operational vehicle resulting from X-30 technology, to 
today's military capabilities in performing what may be well defined missions of 
today's military forces, a mistake avoided by the current DSB assessment. 
The time frame for the consideration of operational vehicles resulting from 
X-30 technology in conducting future military operations is in the period of 2020-
2025, about thirty years from today. The NAS? must complete the X-30 
experimental flight vehicle program, and operational vehicle system development 
must be completed before achieving an operational configuration and operational 
status.
Realistically, then: 
—w—First-flight of the X-30 experimental flight vehicle will not likely occur 
before 2002 and first SSTO demonstration before 2005. 
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It is unlikely that a decision to proceed with system development of an 
operational vehicle resulting from X-30 technology will occur until after flight test 
evaluations are completed some two yeai., or more after SSTO. This puts the 
decision period about 2007. 
• Development of the operational configuration and the initial production 
will take about 10 years, leading to an initial operational capability about 2017 and 
full operational capability possible in the 2020-21 period. 
• The operationally useful period for the vehicle to perform military 
missions will probably be 20-40 years - through the period 2020-2060. 
The realization of the extensive time frame before NASP would lead to an 
operationally useful vehicle demands some new and innovative thinking about the 
future military and political environment in which NASP must operate. Current 
technologies will no longer be applicable; political realities of today will be history in 
40 years or so; military alignments of today could be drastically changed; and the 
comparison of capabilities of operational vehicles which result from X-30 
technology to current means of conducting military missions would be obsolete. In 
the time frame of the future we must not only think of these vehicles as a way to 
perform classic military missions but, in addition, as a technology that would permit 
us to perform new military missions that would enhance our security. 
While it is next to impossible to predict with any certainty the environment 
of the future world and what military capability will be demanded of U.S. forces in 
that environment, there are some common characteristics of that environment that 
are likely:
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I. there will be a proliferation of high technology weapon systems around the 
world to those nations which had not previously had access to such 
capabilities, 
many of those systems and platforms will have the ability to deliver devices 
and weapons of mass destruction, 
• many countries who have such weapon systems will have internal goals and 
objectives which are in conflict with the interests of the United States and our 
allies, 
not only will such countries possess threatening military capabilities, they 
will also possess the surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to observe 
U.S. and allied activities and deliver these weapons at long range with 
precision.	 - 
These common environmental conditions some thirty years in the future 
provide strong arguments for providing the military commanders and the President 
with a military weapon system having a reasonable turn around and short 
preparation time; capable of reaching long distances, rapidly and undetected; capable 
of doing its own surveillance; and able to deliver weapons with great precision. The 
flexibility of a manned system wouL 1 be particularly attractive. The technology 
being developed in the X-30 program would be directly applicable to a future 
military platform resulting from X-30 technology that would meet these 
requirements. Such a system would give the U.S. the following unique military 
advantages: 
an ability to enter into a performance and physical domain not easily 
available to other potential military powers, 
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• very rapid access to space for a variety of classical military satellite delivery or 
anti-satellite missions, 
• ability to put a manned vehicle over any part of the world within the shortest 
III
feasible period of time (orbital velocity) and return quickly to a secure base. 
• faster speeds would put the vehicle into an earth escape velocity and slower 
speeds would require very demanding, long-range intra-atmospheric 
hypersonic flights, 
a payload capacity to perform surveillance, communications and global power 
projection missions, 
• ability to maintain an on-orbit "alert" capability with the NASP-type fleet of

vehicles for even more rapid response or for a "show of force" capability, 
• through basing, atmospheric maneuvers, and orbital plane changes, 
essentially deny an adversary knowledge of the ultimate target and the ability 
to take effective defensive actions, 
exploitation of the combinations of advancing technologies in 
communications, computational capabilities, sensors, guidance systems, laser 
weapons developments, munitions and electronics in a unique military 
platform for future, and as yet undefined, military missions. 
The tremendous potential of the technologies being developed for NASP, 
either in a direct military application, or as spin-offs to other military systems, 
argues strongly for the continued development of NASP leading. to an ultimate 
flight test including the SSTO demonstration, and an operational vehicle resulting 
from X-30 technology. SSTO is clearly one of the features of NASP that makes most
of the mission attributes discussed above worthwhile and the vehicle highly 
valuable to military operations. It is the single most important performance 
parameter that should be retained.
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Based on the above, Task Force deliberations led to the following 
recommendations: 
1. Continue the NASP program, including the requirement to ultimately 
demonstrate the SSTO capability, so long as the vehicle performance appears to be 
feasible. The unique capability and military flexibility such a vehicle would give a 
future President and military commander, in light of future world uncertainties, 
should be preserved. 
2. Do not enter into a Phase III, Experimental Flight Vehicle Phase, at this time. 
While program 
-progress has been impressi e, 
-NASR-configuration-is - still 
immature and there remains sufficient risk and uncertainty that proceeding with a 
prototype flight test program for the current configuration would be premature. 
3. Proceed with a revised next phase. which we would define as Phase HE, over 
the next three years to emphasize continued risk reduction and the addition of 
gne component flight tests to validate computational design techniques. We 
recognize that while flight tests short of the fu l l configuration will never 
demonstrate the performance feasibility of the NAS? design, tests of unmanned 
sub-scale vehicles incorporating boundary layer transition measurements and 
engine components will be extremely valuable to validate the design and 
computational techniques essential for completing the full scale engine and vehicle 
design.
4. Technology options should be revised during Phase HE. The press of the 
schedule to enter Phase III resulted in decisions being made to "freeze" technology, 
especially in materials, to permit design solutions to be completed. With additional 
27
Itime being provided in the Phase HE period, these decisions should be revisited and 
modified as appropriate. 
5.	 Government funding for Phase UP should be sufficient that by the end of this 
phase the component flight test proam would 3jeld adequate data to proceed into 
the next phase. We would estimate that the annual funding for the next three years 
would be roughly $250-400 million per year. The "Exit Criteria for a decision to 
proceed would be the same as have been established for the previously defined 
Phase ifi, but with more explicit criteria for assessment of the knowledge of 
boundary layer transition on NASP, scramjet performance at high Mach numbers, 
and feasibility of developing an operational vehicle resulting from X-30 technology. 
6. NASA should begin to assume an equal share of the NASP Program 
Funding.. 
7. The DoD and NASA should conduct a joint utility study to evaluate the uses 
of X-30 technologies and potential missions for future operational vehicles. 
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WASHINGTON. DC 20301•3010
20 FEB 1992 
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD 
SUBJECT: Terms of Referenc--Defense Science Board Task Force on 
National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) Program 
You are requested to organize a Defense Science Board Task 
Force to review technical progress and report your assessment of 
the technology development associated with the National Aero-
Space Plane (NASP) Program. The task force should hold its first 
meeting in March 1992 and brief its findings and recommendations 
to me three months after the first meeting. A final report is 
required 30 days following the briefing. The task force should 
be supported by government advisors from OSD, SDIO, the Joint 
Staff, NASA, USAF, and Navy. 
Six years ago, the Defense Science Board (DSB) initiated a 
review of the concept, technical basis, program content, and 
missions of the NAS? program. The report was completed in 
September, 1988, and the recommendations contributed to 
strengthening the technical efforts in the NASP program. 
Since then, substantial technological progress Las been made 
in the technology development phase (Phase II) of the program. 
Phase II of the program is currently scheduled to end in late 
Fiscal Year 1993, with a decision whether to proceed to the 
experimental flight vehicle phase (Phase III) to be made at that 
time. This decision will be a very significant one for the 
Department of Defense and NASA. It is therefore desirable for 
the DSB to revisit the WASP program to assess the degree to which 
the many technical challenges of the program have been resolved, 
or are likely to be resolved by the end of Phase II. 
Lie issues that the Task Force should address include, but 
are not limited to: 
1. Are the current Phase II Exit Criteria, if 
satisfied, adequate to justify a decision to proceed to 
Phase III?
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2. Regarding Phase II, are completed and planned 
technical efforts likely to satisfy the current Phase II Exit 
Criteria, or the exit criteria needed to justify a decision to 
proceed to Phase III' The efforts in materials and structures 
for both airframe and engine are of particular interest. 
3. What are the candidate military missions for NASP-
derived vehicles, and what are the technical achievements 
required in the current NASP program to make such vehicles 
viable?	 - 
4. Will the current plans for the Phase 111 effort, if 
completely successful, produce the basis needed to enter system 
development for a militarily useful vehicle? 
The Director, Defense Research and Engineering is the 
sponsor of this Task Force. Dr. Joseph F. Shea will serve as 
Chairman, Dr. Donald M. Dix will be the Executive Secretary, and 
LtCc]. David L. Beadner, USAF, will be the DSB Secretariat 
Representative. The DDDR&E(P&R) will provide necessary 
additional travel funding and DDDR&E(R&AT) will make arrangements 
for and provide funding of any support contract efforts. It is 
not anticipated that this study will cause any member to be 
placed in the position of acting as a "procurement official" for 
the purposes of section 27 of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy Act.
Victor H. Reis 
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APPENDIX C 
AGENDAS 
DSB AGENDA
NASP JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE

WRIGHT PA1TERSON AFB, OHIO

MARCH 12-13,1992 
March 12, 1992 
0730 Chairman's Time / Ethics Brief Dr. Shea / Lt Col Beadner 
0815 Program Overview / Exit Criteria Dr. Barthelemy 
0930 Break 
0945 Air Vehicle Design Status Mr. Imfeld 
1145 Working Lunch 
1230 Aerodynamics Mr. Thor 
1300 Structures & Materials Dr. Ronald 
1400 Break 
1415- Structures &Materials- (cont) MrImfeki 
1445 Propulsion Mr. Imfeld 
1615 Discussion Dr. Shea 
1730 Adjourn 
March 13, 1992
0730 Chairman's Time Dr. Shea 
0800 Propulsion (cont) Mr. Imfeld 
1000 Break 
1015 Flight Control Mr. Mut.zman 
1100 Subsystems Mr. Imfeld 
1130 Tracking Milestones Mr. Imfeld 
1145 Working Lunch 
1230 Phase 3 Program Plans Col Wierzbanowski 
1300 NDV Applications LtCol Xiques 
1400 Break 
1415 Executive Session (DSB MEMBERS) Dr. Shea 
1500 Adjourn
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DSB AGENDA
NASP National Program Office

Palmdale, California 
April 16-17, 1992 
April 16, 1992 
0800 Overview Mr. Waldman. 
0900 X-30 Design Dr. Chaput 
-	 System Overview 
-	 Closure 
1000 Break 
1015 Vehicle Definition Dr. Chaput 
1145 Vehicle Management Dr. Schwanz 
1230 Working Lunch 
1300 Closing Comments Dr. Chaput 
1315 Hardware Display Mr. Newmann/ 
Dr. Chaput 
1400 Splinter Sessions 
-	 Structures Mr. Eilis 
-	 Boundary Layer Trans. Mr. Haney 
-	 Flight Test/Applications Col. Wierzbanowski/ 
Ltc. Matthews 
1730 Working Dinner 
1930 Executive Session Dr. Shea & DSB 
2130 Adjourn 
April 17, 1992 
0800 Engine Flowpath Physics Dr. Moon 
0930 Break 
0945 Engine Aerodynamic Design Dr. Kawecki 
1200 Working Lunch 
1245 Closing Remarks Dr. Moon 
1300 X-30 Engine Design Mr. Ratekin 
1315 Integrated Propulsion System Mr. O'Coruior 
1400 Break 
1415 Low Speed System Mr. Sack 
1445 Engine Mechanical Mr. Ernst 
1615 Development Plans Mr. Ratekin 
1630 Executive Session Dr. Shea & DSB 
1730 Adjourn
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NASA Langley Research Center

DSB AGENDA 
Newport News, Virginia

May 14-15,1992
•	 May 14, 1992 
0800 Welcome 
•
-	 NASP Program Discussion 
0830 Overview of NASA's NASP Role 
0900 Computational Fluid Dynamics 
-	 Transition Prediction Methods 
Development 
-	 Transition Methods Application 
to X-30 
1000 Break 
1015 Aero/Aerothermodynamics 
1045 Propulsion 
-	 High Speed Performance and 
Methods 
•
-	 100 Megawatt Facility Prop lsion 
Tests 
1200 Structures 
1230 Subsystems - Slush 
Working Lunch 
1300 Air Force Hypersonics Technology 
Initiative 
1345 Phase 2D 
1445 Break 
1500 Risk Reduction 
1545 Phase 3A 
1645 Scale up to SSTO NDV's 
1730 Chairman's Time 
1830 Adjourn 
Evening Executive Session at Hotel
Dr. Beach 
Ms. Couch 
Dr. Dwoyer 
Dr. Zang 
Dr. Kei Lau, MDAC 
Mr. Paulson 
Mr. Anderson 
Mr. McClinton 
Mr. Covington 
Mr. Moses 
Mr. Hannüm 
Dr. Richey 
Mr. Imfeld 
Dr. Harsha 
Dr. Barthelemy 
Mr. Kasten 
Dr. Shea 
Dr. Shea & DSB 
May 15, 1992 
0800	 All day DSB Executive Session 
1230	 Working Lunch 
1430	 Adjourn
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PAGE	 TOPIC 
D-2	 PROGRAM DIRECTOR'S 
LETTER 
0-4	 INTRODUCTION 
D-5	 AIRFRAME & ENGINE 
STRUCTURES / MATERIALS 
D-8	 AERODYNAMICS 
0-10	 AEROTHERMAL 
0-12	 X-30 VEHICLE DESIGN 
D-14	 X-30 ENGINE DESIGN 
D-17	 GUIDANCE & CONTROL 
D-20	 COMPUTATIONAL FLUID 
DYNAMICS 
D-1
D-2
•	 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
HEADQUARTERS AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS CENTER (AFMC) 
WRIG.IT.PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE. OHIO 
FROM: ASC/NA	 14 MPY 1992 
SUBJ: NASP Status Report 
TO: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
ArrN: Dr. Joseph F. Shea 
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
Cambridge MA 02139 
Attached to this letter is the NASP status report for your use wth the NASP Defense Science 
Board Task Force activities. If you have any questions, don't L rate to call Mr. Jim Arrington, 
my NASA Principal Deputy, for additional information. He C: be reached at 513-255-8158. 
DR. ROBERT R. BARTHELEMY,SES	 1 Atch 
Program Director	 NASP Status Report 
National Aero-Space Plane Joint ProgLam Office 
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SECTION 1.0 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this document is to summarize the status of the National Aerospace 
Plane Program relative to the reviews of the program by the Defense Science Board. 
The format used in each of the major technical areas is to status the program as it was 
at the time of the last DSB review, summarize what has been accomplished since 
then, status the present state of the program, and explain what needs to be done in the 
remainder of phase 2D.
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SECTION 2.0 
AIRFRAME AND ENGINE STRUCTURES AND MATERIALS 
• WHERE WE WERE (1987-1988) 
At this time lightweight materials with sufficient high temperature capabilities were not 
available to meet NASP single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) requirements. The NASP 
design lacked maturity in that thermal/ structural analysis associated with both the 
engine and airframe designs were very limited. There was no funded p!an in place to 
validate thermal/structural component concepts, loads, or design tools. Improvements 
in high temperature strength, oxidation resistance, and fabrication quality were 
• needed for titanium matrix composite (TMC) airframe fuselage panels and support 
structures. Advancements in thermal protection system (TPS) materials were needed 
to protect the vehicle flowpath and engine nozzle surfaces. Refractory composite (RC) 
materials which could meet this need required improvements in oxidation resistance 
and development of lightweight designs and fabrication methods. Actively cooled 
structural designs applicable to very highly heated regions such as ramps, nozzles, 
and leading edges were just beginning to be developed. Materials for high 
- temperature engine applications also had not beéndéveloped or demonstrated for 
NASP requirements. 
WHAT WE DID (19881991) 
In October 1987 Phase 2 of the NASP program was initiated. Under this phase of the 
NASP contract, structural analysis tools were developed and materials and structures 
risk reduction activities (Task 0 of each contractors contract) were ini t! ated. Significant 
contributions were made as a result of these activities as follows: 
- Developed automated thermal/structural design and nalysis tools to 
evaluate the complex structural response of the NASP vehic'j. 
- Defined and initiated technology development progr.rns to validate 
component concepts, design tools, and weights to meet the NASP Phase 2D 
exit criteria. 
- Defined non-uniform and dynamic engine and airfrane pressure and 
acoustic loads. 
- Defined and initiated plans to develop facilities to test structural components 
under X-30 conditions. 
- Fabricated large (up to 8'x8'x4') cryotank and fuselage structures, 
representative of those in the vehicle design and successfully tested them 
with combined liquid hydrogen cryogen, external heating, and applied 
fuselage bending loads. 
- Fabricated and tested large (up to 4'x8') TMC and C-C wing structures. 
- Initiated development of IM-7/977-2 carbon epoxy for cryogenic tankage. 
In late 1987 the NASP Materials and Structures Augmentation Program (NMASAP) 
was initiated, at the recommendation of the Defense Science Board. The objective 
was to develop materials, manufacturing processes, and structural concepts that 
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7would enable the United States to achieve the NASP goal of demonstrating a SSTO 
space-capable aircraft. This program has been a cooperative effort between five 
prime engine and airframe contractors, several government agencies and a large 
number of subcontractors. The consortium carried out research and development in 
five key material areas: 1) Titanium Matrix Composites; 2) Titanium Aluminides; 3) 
Refractory Composites; 4) High Conductivity Composites; and 5) High Specific Creep 
Strength Materials. Activities and accomplishments of this consortium include: 
- Defined low-to-moderate risk baseline materials. 
- Conducted preliminary and detailed thermal/structural analyses to 
substantiate material selection, design concepts, and weights. 
- Tested thousands of material and structural coupons to determine properties 
and response to NASP environments. 
- Developed a new titanium matrix alloy (Beta 21S) with capabilities that 
exceed the required life at temperatures of 1500°F (higher than 1200°F 
previously available) in both low pressure hydrogen and air atmospheres. 
- Developed and tested high quality titanium matrix composite fuselage 
structural panels to demonstrate load and thermal cycling capability. 
- Developed and demonstrated manufacturing methods and processes for 
lightweight refractory composite TPS designs (carbon-carbon and carbon-
silicon carbide). 
- Developed reliable carbon-carbon oxidation protection systems for 50 to 100 
hours at peak temperatures up to 2600°F. 
- Developed and demonstrated fasteners, attachment concepts and joints for 
the various material systems and structural requirements. 
- Conducted limited manufacturing scale-up demonstrations. 
WHERE WE ARE 
Significant advances have been made in materials development for NASP P"-,-ame 
and engine structures. These advancements have been made in a relative. 1 .short 
time. They are being integrated into the vehicle design process to give it increased 
fidelity as it matures. In addition to the significant technology advances which feed 
directly into the design definition, the industry, vendor, and government laboratory 
community capability to proceed efficiently both individually and as a team has been 
vastly upgraded as a result of the NASP program. 
We are designing, fabricating and testing subelement articles to expand/validate the 
actively cooled structures concepts. Continuing to design and fabricate components to 
demonstrate scaleup capabilities in the areas of TMC and C/C. TPS work is 
continuing in the area of material characterization to expand the database to provide 
higher confidence and understanding of the X-30 materials. 
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE (1992-1994) 
Work to be done before Phase 3 includes: I	 - Complete airframe and engine materials characterization coupon testing to provide an acceptable level of confidence in material properties. 
0-6
- Conduct large scale thermal/structural validation, of representative engine 
flowpath components. 
- Test and validate performance of representative cooled panels. 
- Continue development of facilities to provide manufacturing scale-up for X-30 
parts and demonstration. 
- Continue development cf test facilities to provide combined cryogenic, 
thermal, and mechanical loads representative of NASP environments. 
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SECTION 3.0 
AERODYNAMICS 
WHERE WE WERE (1987- 1988) 
During this time different methods were used by each of the CTMs for developing the 
Aero/S&C database and for sizing the control surfaces. The Aero/S&C databases on 
these pre-teaming vehicle concepts were only partially substantiated by wind tunnel 
testing and CFD results. The aero-propulsion interactions were not substantiated by 
powered wind tunnel testing for anything above Mach 1.5. In addition the CFD codes 
used for aerodynamic prediction were not fully validated. 
WHAT WE DID (1938 - 1991) 
After initiation of Phase 2 of the program in late 1987 several contributions to this area 
were made, increasing confidence in the database and analysis. Some of these werR: 
- Reconciled aerodynamic prediction methods for conceptual design, using 
applicable pre-team test data and calibrated engineering codes (e.g., HABP). 
- Defined control surface sizing criteria for conceptual design, using static S&C 
analysis at critical flight conditions. 
- Defined and executed wind tunnel test program to provide initial Aero/S&C 
database, including configuration parametrics, for conceptual design. 
- Defined and initiated wind tunnel test program to provide high-fidelity 
aerodynamic database for vehicle performance and stability & control analyses, 
including inlet- and exhaust-induced aero-propulsion interactions. 
- Continued calibration of CFD codes with applicable wind tunnel test data. 
- Defined and initiated plan to enhance high speed wind tunnel facility capabilities 
(e.g., Mach 18 at NSWC). 
- Defined initial aerodynamic uncertainty estimates using pre-team results. 
WHERE WE ARE (1992) 
Fidelity of the Aero/S&C database has been enhanced through utilization of experimental 
data from the initial series of wind tunnel tests covering the Mach no. range from 0.2 to 
10.0. Confidence in aerodynamic prediction methods has been improved through 
calibration of CFD and engineering codes with wind tunnel test data for X-30 vehicle 
shapes. Initial aero control concept and controi surface design criteria have been 
defined, and control surface size/shape have been modified to satisfy design criteria. 
There is insufficient CFD and test data available to substantiate aero-propulsion 
interactions for X-30 vehicle shapes. 
• WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE (1992 - 1994) 
Before instituting Phase 3 some of the work needed includes: 
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Complete the Phase 20 wind tunnel test program to (a) substantiate 
aerodynamic force & moment predictions and (b) calibrate aerodynamic 
prediction tools. 
Continue nose-to-tail CFD analyses to investigate aero-propulsion interactions 
at hypersonic speeds. 
Refine control surface design criteria, using static and dynamic S&C analyses. 
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SECTION 4.0 
AEROTHERMAL 
WHERE WE WERE (1988 - 1989) 
In this time frame the aerothermal analysis methods used by each of the CTMs varied 
widely in scope, complexity, and level of integration. The aerothermal design analysis 
being performed then were done primarily with engineering codes, due to cost and 
schedue constraints. Any engineering code validation was limited to comparisons 
with unvalidated CFD codes or with wind tunnel data. The boundary layer transition 
prediction methods were empirical correlations of widely varying flight/ground test 
transtion datasets of limited applicability. 
WHAT WE DID (1990 - 1991) 
Initial aerothermal distributions and boundary layer transition data was collected on 
each CTM configuration. 
During this time frame efforts began to focus on the team coifiguraTiöñ and 
strengthening prediction methods and analysis. These efforts included: 
- Compared aerothermal analysis codes, determined causes for major 
prediction differences, and selected codes for specific applications consistent 
with code capabilities. 
- Planned and executed wind tunnel testing to provide additional aerothermal 
distributions and boundary layer transition data on current NASP 
configuration to existing pre-teamed database. 
- Defined high-fidelity wind tunnel test program (Model 0) to provide high-
Mach aerothermal data on current NASP configuration, including detailed 
fuselage, wing, tail, and reenty engine components. 
Defined and initiated a phased upgrade plan to improve the design criteria 
for boundary layer transition through use of parametric linear stability 
analysis and quiet tunnel test data. 
• Commenced extensive effort to checkout, validate, and implement the e-Malik 
2D linear stability code, including benchmark solutions, investigation of 
quality requirements for CFD mean flow solutions, and evaluation of specific 
requirements for blunt body solutions. 
WHERE WE ARE (1992) 
Boundary layer transition analysis capability has been enhanced by the availability of 
new tools: 
- Quiet tunnel test facilities 
- Two-and three-dimensional linear stability codes 
Much progress has been made in the implementation of the linear stability codes. The 
current design transiton criterion was based entirely on 20 linear stability analysis.
Tasks are underway to combine available quiet tunnel data and analysis results to 
fUrther refine the criterion. There is insufficient experimental data available at high 
Mach number conditions for validation of bouraacy layer transition methods for X-30 
vehicle shapes. 
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE (1992 - 1994)

During this phase of the program efforts are still needed to: 
- Complete the Phase 2D wind tunnel test program to provide (a) data for 
aerothermal code validation and (b) data to augment aerothermal database 
in situations where analysis is uncertain. 
- As vehicle external shape matures, increase use of CFD analyses to 
substantiate engineering predictions and investigate issues such as flow 
separation, shock interactions, and wall catalycity. 
/ 
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SECTION 5. 
X-30 VEHICLE DESIGN 
• WHERE WE WERE (1987-1988) 
The X-30 design effort reflected the imbalance between design knowledge and actual 
technology status. Design decisions were made with assumed technology trends, 
resulting in very different design paths. Many models and experiments to obtain 
technology were initiated. Technology was beginning to become available for the pre-
team design effort. Also, the contractors were aware of the design drivers, the need for 
inter-functional integration, airframe/engine integration and sensitivity of designs to 
various parameters. The design activities included parametric optimizations based 
upon technical interactions. The importance of engine on the controllability of the 
aircraft was noted. Concerns existed in areas critical to the design. Plans were in 
place to understand and reduce the risk in these critical areas. 
The Technology Maturation Program (TMP) was working on a broad set of generic 
technology and had not focused-on-a single- configuration-because of the ongoing --- - 
competition. 
• WHAT WE DID (1988-1991) 
To ensure orbit capability the design criteria were aggressively established. Design 
efforts were downscaled in favor of technology deveIopm. '. Technology concerns 
critical to the design were emphasized and prioritized. Advanced materials, slush 
hydrogen, engine technology and CFD technology were greatly enhanced. Test data 
from efforts initiated pre-team were converted into a team database. Critical 
technology issues were re-evaluated and prioritized from a team point of view. 
The TMP received increased effort in critical areas to enhance exit from Phase 2. The 
Material Consortium was formed to accelerate the rate of materiI technology and 
directed toward providing required material property data. Capability ir high 
temperature and heat flux, severe acoustic and non-uniform environments were 
addressed. Some large components built in pre-team were modified. Many non-
criticai technology developments were deferred. Program technology milestones were 
developed to structure performance and risk tracking. Scheduled completion would 
fall out from milestone completion and available funds. The first flight date was 
delayed to meet certain milestones, but was still aggressive. 
• WHERE WE ARE (1992) 
The design is now consistent with technology. Configuration optimization shows hope 
of improving performance or reducing risk. The team has demonstrated ability to 
optimize the design with new technology, assumptions and requirements. Technology 
concerns have 'diminished in areas critical to the design. Prediction of the BLT 
location is improving. Material selections are now compatible. Uncertainty reduction 
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and su'ess in ground tests have improved airframe structural design fidelity. 
Aflordabe 3D CFD is utilized in design with increasing accuracy due to. IMP testing. 
The overall program effort is close to achieving the technicai objectives of Phase 2. 
Some technology issues have been deferred. The team design has been shown to be 
superior to pre-team designs in terms of increased realism and shape optimization. 
• WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE (1992-1994) 
During the remainder of Phase 2 the design will be matured by considering 
simultaneous changes to multiple parameters in trade studies. Integration of test 
results into the design will continue focusing on risk reduction: 
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SECTION 6.0 
X-30 ENGINE DESIGN 
A 
I
WHERE WE WERE (1987 - 1988) 
In 1987 the X-30 engine concept had consisted of a low speed accelerator for Ma
numbers from 0 to about 3, a ramjet for operation between about 3 to 6, and a scramjet
operation between about Mach 6 to orbit. Prior to 1988, no NASP applicable data had be' 
developed for the program. Data from experiments conducted in the 1950's and 196( 
demonstrated the feasibility for each of the modes. No external burning design data existi 
for this type of engine. The challenge was to combine these multiple modes into a usat 
 propulsion system. 
The 1987 engine structure and its associated weight was based on advanced materia 
including new rapid-solidification-rate titanium alloys, metal-matrix composites, a 
advanced beryllium. Tha X-30 structural arrangements were very conceptual with lit 
depth of structural analysis to substantiate them. Sizing of flowpath primary structure w 
accomplished using very approximate beam equations for the maximum started pressu 
flight condition. Predicted unstart loads using normal shock theory were as much as five 
ten times the started loads and no reasonable structural solution to accommodate them w 
apparent at that time. Global flutter predictions for large structural panels subject 
aerodynamic instabilities did not exist. 
exchangers and leading edges when subjected to very high heat fluxes. The extreme 10 
heat flux (as high as 1O0 I 000 BTU/ft sec) on the cowl leading edge due to shock interactic 
was feared by many to be a show-stopper. Acoustic load predictions were made using 
empirical approach based on limited rar.jet rig data at Mach numbers below 6. 
Only first order approximations existed for the inelastic strains experienced by flowpath hc 
• WHAT WE DID (1988 - 1991) 
LOW SPEED ACCELERATOR: The liquid air system has been tested on an integrated  
complete with the whole sequence of heat exchangers consisting of dehumidifier, precool 
and condenser. 
The aerodynamic performance of the .10w speed system has been well characteriz 
through extensive small scale cold flow rig tests and hot-fired large scale rig tests. Data fr 
the large scale tests, covered the Mach range of 0 to 2.7. 
INLET: Significant progress has been made over the last 5 years in the understanding of 
aerodynamics of hypersonic inlets. This understanding has been brought about by t 
advances in computational fluid dynamics and the extensive experimental evaluations t 
have been conducted.
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Nine dedicated inlet tests have been conducted to generate parametric data and evaluate 
specific geometries. These tests covered the Mach range from takeoff through M=16 and 
accounted for over 4500 test runs. The experimental objectives included evaluation 
operability characteristics as well as basic performance. Mode transitions were investigated 
as well as integration of the low speed system and subcritical spillage drags. Unstart loads 
have been extensively explored. 
Sub and large scale integrated engine tests have also provided much information in 
combustor-inlet interactions, unstart characteristics, module interactions and basic 
operability characteristics. These tests have been conducted over the Mach range from 
takeoff to M=6.0. 
COMBUSTORS: The design data base for the X30 combustor has been extensively 
expanded through sequential series of component tests, leading to subscale engine tests, 
small leading to large-scale engine tests. Multiple component tests have provided an 
experimental benchmark for calibration of CFD methods. The small scale engine tests were 
parametric in nature, and the results provided the design data base for designing the larger-
scale design specific rigs that followed. Large scale combustor data have been and 
continue to be collected extensively. Since 1987, parametric data have been generated 
with large scale rigs covering the Mach range from 2.5 to 8, in configurations representing 
ram and scram for the appropriate Mach numbers. The early test articles were parametric, 
with the more recent ones reflecting X-30 design specific configurations. 
NOZZLE: As with inlets, significant progress has been made over the last five years in 
understanding the aerodynamics of hypersonic nozzles. Both generic and configuration-
specific w.id tunnel evaluations of nozzle/aftbody combinations have been made from 
takeoff to M=3.5 flight conditions. Nozzle-only evaluations of thrust coefficient and pitching 
moments have been accomplished at simulated engine conditions up to M=20. These 
investigations also looked at the influence of module out and provide insight into pressure 
distributions and the resultant panel loadings. Although the tests were designed to provide 
stand-alone design-performance data, much useful CFD calibration data was obtained. 
Kinetic reaction rate experiments have been conducted for key H2/02 reactions at higher 
temperatures than previously obtained. Unique experiments were accomplished in a Shock 
Tunnel using "Time Equivalent Nozzles." Experiments have been conducted with external 
burning both in wind tunnels and in flight on an F-18. These tests were aimed at 
performance, piloting, and stability limit definition. 
ENGINE STRUCTURES: Currently, flowpath primary structure is sized using detailed finite 
element models of engine components coupled with a structural optimization code to 
produce minimum weight designs. Unstart loads have been shown through extensive rig 
testing to be less severe than previously predicted and feasible structural designs have 
been developed to accommodate these loads. Flutter codes have been developed. A 
completely new code based on supersonic wave theory was developed for the transonic 
regime. Flowpath heat exchangers and cooled leading edges are currently analyzed with 
detailed three dimensional finite element models using non-linear codes that account for all 
material and geometric non-linearities. The X-30 heat exchangers and leading edges have 
been shown to be viable designs and are being substantiated through extensive testing in 
high heat flux and laser facilities. Empirical acoustic load prediction methods have been 
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modified based on additional rig data, and an analytical approach based on vis 
algorithms for attached boundary layer flow has been developed. 
• WHERE WE ARE (1992) 
Although the measured LSS efficiencies were lower than desired, the operability d 
obtained sijbsantiates the current design system. These tests also provided transit: 
characteristics that provide guidance in designing follow-on test articles to demonstr 
transition from the low sped mode to the ramjetmode. 
Advances in the computational fluids and kinetics areas have made it possible, know 
combustor exit conditions, to analyze nozzle configurations not possible five years a 
Boundary layer routines are now in existence that include mass addition and all 
evaluations of its influence on heat transfer and skin friction. 
Today the engine structure consists of conventional materials. To minimize system wei 
impacts, innovative/structural concepts have been employed. Simultaneously, the eng 
structure has been modularized in a structurally repeatable fashion to ensure testabilit 
the engine flowpath. 
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE (1992 - 1994) 
Future combustor tests will evaluate updated X-30 lines at Mach 6-17. These tests will 
conducted in continuous flow (Mach 6-12) and impulse (Mach 10-17) facilities ir 
coordinated effort that will provide data to verify the test techniques and provide design d 
These tests will include parametrics on fuel injectors, base pressurization techniques, 
cooling and combustor length as a benchmark for CFD code calibration. A valuable proc 
of the test program is the formulation and continuous refinement of a combustor de 
system. 
The planned Phase 2 approach is to demonstrate the X-30 engine design in a small sc 
pre-demonstrator engine, followed by a larger (30%) engine scale CDE (Conc 
Demonstrator Engine). The CDE engine will incorporate enough flexibility in its mechan 
arrangement to evaluate geometry perturbations about the baseline design. It will be te 
at Mach 5, 6, and 6.8.
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SECTION 7.0 
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL 
WHERE WE WERE (1987 - 1988) 
The guidance and control system for the NASP integrates the operation of the airframe, the 
main engine and rocket, the power generation, the thermal protection and the propellant 
distribution subsystems at the direction of the crew. 
The design and technology results in 1987 were limited: 
- Vehicle and mission optimization was partially complete for non real-time 
simulation. 
- Guidance and control logic relied upon an incomplete knowledge of the 
airframe, engine, and rocket system. 
- Dynamics included rigid airframe and a simple time-lag engine model, but no 
subsystem representations. 
- Environment was for a "standard atmosphere" appropriate for subsonic and 
supersonic flight by conventional aircraft. 
- Computer hardware and software were undefined and suppliers were not 
identified. 
Engine control was not well defined or was limited to uncomplicated SSTO 
vehicle operations. 
• WHAT WE DID (1988-1991) 
Vehicle and Mission Optimization: Trajectory optimization algorithms a priori define an 
SSTO ascent and descent flight profile and correct the profile in real time during flight. Two 
optimizers were developed and tested using X-30 configurations. In one test the algorithms 
were evaluated on a real-time simulator in which the aircraft was flown from lift-off to orbital 
insertion. An abort guidance algorithm was developed and simulated that predicts available 
landing sites and suggests a new trajectory to follow to the site that is selected. The abort 
scenarios for SSTO and flight test expansion are now being analyzed for situations thought 
to be critical for sizing the aircraft,the engine.and its subsystems. A preliminary assessment 
of the Mach 12 flight test mission indicated the power subsystems are driven by the more 
demanding, high dynamic pressure SSTO mission. 
Guidance and Control Logic: A preliminary set of logic equations that implement the 
guidance and control solutions on the flight computers have been developed and simulated 
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in both real and non real-time. The emphasis has been on the SSTO ascent and desc 
missions. 
Dynamics: The X-30 exhibits unique and complex dynamic behavior due to 1) the interac 
lower surface flowpath, 2) the distribution of nozzle lift and moments, and 3) the depende, 
of airframe and engine safety and operability on the subsystems. The design of the veh 
and control system has ic2!t with these problems by decoupling the engine and airfra 
time scales as much as possible and by adding operational margins to both the airframe 
engine control systems. 
Environment Definition: The X-30 ascends and descends through the entire atmospher 
and from space. It encounters large statistical variations from the standard atmosphc 
depending upon the altitude, global location and time of the year. A new global refere. 
atmosphere has been developed for the X-30. This new model is applicable to all veh 
design applications and is presently being approximated for real-time simulation purpo 
Initial assessments indicate that the engine and the airframe will operate with large 
density and temperature variations that must be accommodated by the control system, 
subsystems and the structure during flight. 
Computer Hardware and Software: The VMS hardware and software and related electro 
and crew vision systems, implement the airframe and engine guidance and control lo 
monitor and adjust the subsystems, and collect the flight test data. Design since 1987 
resulted in computers sized with excess throughput and memory to accommodate ft 
uncertainty. Also the operating software has been partitioned by function and subsyster 
facilitate necessary changes during the test program. Real-time simulation and two sepa 
flight test programs were conducted in 1989-1990 to verify the vision system requireme 
Two separate crew vision systems have been flight tested. Seventy five landings v 
performed on a NASA F-104 and one hundred and fifty landings were performed on a N 
B-737 using these new crew vision systems. 
Engine Control: The NASP airbreathing engine control concept has evolved and imprc 
with each iteration of the engine design. Pre-prototype electronic control fabrication 
been completed. These controls have been used to develop low speed and ramjet co 
concepts during large scale freejet engine tests and on the closed-loop electronic coni 
bench. 
Candidate component concepts have been identified for the Full Authority Digital Electr 
Control (FADEC), the propellant and ancillary system valves, sensors, and the en 
variable geometry actuation system. The development of a valve to modulate and 
hydrogen at temperatures as high as 2000 degrees Rankine is a risk. A prototype v 
concept was selected, designed and built and successfully tested at a hot hydrogen facilit 
• WHERE WE ARE (1992) 
Presently the guidance and control system for the X-30 is conceptually designed for 
SSTO and reentry trajectory. Current design activity is determining failure conditions or, 
SSTO trajectory and creating guidance and control logic to maintain fail safe opera 
Flight test operation analyses have been initiated. This involves more detailed dyna 
models of the airframe, engine and their subsystems, which adds further fidelity to the S: 
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solutions. Technology programs for real time simulation, high temperature instrumentation, 
reliable communication, forward and side vision and engine control hardware and software 
are in place and proceeding per the schedule and budget plan.. 
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE (1992-1994) 
The current guidance and control designs and technology programs will proceed to an 
additional level of confidence before the end of Phase lID: 
- Vehicle and mission optimization will reflect flight test envelope expansion 
requirements verified by simulation. 
- Dynamics will include mode transition, transient thrust operation and engine-out 
transient effects on the airframe, the engine, and the propellant, power and thermal 
subsystems. Parametric uncertainty will be introduced to determine performance and 
stability margins on the SSTO trajectory and within the flight test ewelope. 
--
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SECTION 8.0 
COMPUTATIONAL FLUID DYNAMICS 
• WHERE WE WERE (1987 - 1988) 
CFD in 1987 was still in the developmental stage. Basic codes that are being applied 
to the design process of NASP today were being developed at that time. Most ofthe 
code development up to that time had centered around 20 solutions, mainly 
Parabolized Navier-Stokes, PNS, and 3D Euler solutions. Simple zero equation 
turbulence models were mainly utilized in full Navier-Stokes, FNS, codes though two 
equation models were available in simple PNS codes. Code development was at the 
point where each component of the vehicle/flow path was analyzed with a different 
code. However, capability to analyze a complete vehicle using either 2D or 3D full 
Navier-Stokes algorithms was in early development This new capability captured the 
equilibrium air effects but did not account for the flow path chemical kinetics effects. 
Application of CFD for aerodynamic analysis was limted to 3D Euler(lnviscid) results 
with adjustments for viscous effects using either 2D PNS or ENS solutions. Most of the 
application of CFD for aerodynamic effects was limited to forebody flow fields though 
complete vehicle solutions had been demonstrated. Applications of CFD for the flow 
path trade studies and design performance estimates were Iimite.d to 20 PNS 
solutions with 2D ENS results coming on line. 
Calibration of the CFD codes was limited to simple benchmark cases or component 
solutions at a limited Mach number range. Therefore, design applications were 
geared to obtaining solutions with limited knowledge on requirements for accurate 
solutions. 
Boundary layer transition prediction capability, was also limited to empirical 
correlations of the available experimental data bases which consisted mainly of 
conical shapes with limited flight data. Unear stability theory was being investigated 
but no applications had been made to NASP vehicles. 
• WHAT WE DID (1988 - 1991) 
Since 1987 CFD code development has continued to the point where the entire 
airframe and engine can be and is being analyzed with CFD. Code development has 
involved both industry and government with codes now capable of 3D nose to tail 
analysis developed. The code development has included upgrades to both 
turbulence models and transition prediction. This has been supported by activities 
performed by the government in the Technology Maturation Program and currently in 
the Government Work Packages in the areas of transition and turbulence modeling 
and linear stability theory. As part of the code development, code calibration activities 
have also expanded. This calibration has included new benchmarks investigating 
more complicated physics than studied previously, especially in the area of 
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combustion and mixing. CFD codes, both those developed by the contractors and the 
government have been calibrated against complete NASP configurations. In the 
process of calibration against data code to code bench marking has occurred and 
sensitivity studies performed investigating the sensitivities to turbulence model!ng and 
grid densities. 
WHERE WE ARE (1992) 
Boundary layer transition prediction capability has advanced by the combination of 
linear stability theory with CFD. Linear stability code development by the government 
provided a 2D/axisymmetnc code. CFD codes are used to provide the mean flow 
solutions that are the inputs to the linear stability analysis. This added capability 
allows the impact of transition to be studied and modeled for many parameters such as 
vehicle wall temperature and nose bluntness. 3D CFD analysis has also provided the 
capability to study the effects of vehicle shapes on cross flow Reynolds numbers. 
Today CFD has become an integral part of design process and is utilized in several 
ways. Both 2D and 3D CFD codes are used to analyze the effects of vehicle geometry 
trade studies in the component and vehicle level to optimize component and vehicle 
performance. 3D Euler, PNS, and FNS solutions supplement 20 analysis providing 
3D increments to performance quantities. CFD provides basic. inlet and nozzle 
performance across the Mach number range supplementing ground test data. CFD is 
also used to upgrade and enhance predictions made with simpler aerodynamics and 
aeroheating engineering codes. Wind tunnel testing has begun to make use of CFD 
prior to testing in the model developmental stages to insure that test objectives wi l l be 
met and understand flow field characteristics to aid in placing instrumentation. 
It can be said that application of 2D and 3D Euler, PNS, and FNS algorithms to 
external airframe, inlet, and nozzle flow fields are routine. 31) full Navier-Stokes 
simulations of combustor flow fields have been demonstrated. However much effort is 
still required to improve productivity for this type of flow field and to model the mixing 
property. The codes used today are capable codes that capture the features of the 
NASP flow fields and provide a reasonable definition of most of the physics, though 
areas for significant improvement still exist. 
Todays CFD solutions are more accurate than in the past due to an improved 
awareness and understanding of what is required for solution accuracy. This has 
been accomplished by bench marking, grid studies, and expanded code calibration 
activities. CFD is now calibrated against booth component and global vehicle test 
data including combustion physics and comparisons are generally very good. 
Conservation of how parameters has improved with control volume conservation of 
mass, momentum, and energy demonstrated to better that 0.05%. 
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE (1992 - 1994) 
Activity in CFD development will continue in several areas; code calibration, physics 
enhancement, and productivity improvement. Code calibration .
 activities will continue 
to cover the test database. The efforts in understanding and quantifying sensitivities to 
grid density and algorithm selection will continue. Enhancement of physics in the CFD 
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codes will be pursued in the turbulence and transition modeling and in turbulence-
'-hemistry interactions. 3D effects will be modeled into a transition criteria that can be 
used in the design process.
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